Philosophy as a Way of Life: Searching for philosophical consistency? (Part I)
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Abstract
In this paper, we argue that Pierre Hadot’s popular historiographical thesis regarding “philosophy as a way of life,” wherein the seal of Ancient philosophy was the consistency between life and doctrine, is an empirically untraceable thesis and yet another instance of the so-called “normative fallacy.” It is through this thesis that Hadot projected his conception of philosophy from Monastic Catholicism and Existentialism in Ancient philosophy. Here we show that, without this empirical evidence, said ideal of consistency between life and doctrine loses one of its main foundations. Furthermore, by appealing to recent empirical evidence, we also argue that this ideal is unattainable today.
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